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Abstract 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of the Mexican conditional cash transfer 
programme, Oportunidades, on transfers, savings and consumption for 
treated households. We find positive effects on consumption of non-durable 
and durable goods, an increase in savings coupled with a drop in the number 
and values of loans, and a reduction of in-kind transfers received by 
households in treatment areas. These results are consistent with the existing 
evidence that conditional cash transfer programmes have beneficial effects in 
both the short and medium term, but that they partly crowd out private 
transfers. 
Policy points 
• This paper provides new evidence on the effect of a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programme on consumption, savings and transfers in 
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urban areas to complement the well-known results of its effects in rural 
areas. 
• We find large positive effects on food consumption, an increase in 
savings coupled with a drop in the number and values of loans, and a 
reduction of in-kind transfers. This suggests that CCTs can be effective 
at reducing poverty in urban as well as rural areas, at least in the short 
run. 
• In contrast to rural areas, where the transfer is used to finance productive 
activities (such as micro-enterprises and agricultural activities), in urban 
areas savings are primarily used to pay off debts. When this result is 
coupled with a reduction in transfers received by the beneficiary 
families, it suggests that CCTs in urban areas might be less successful in 
enabling productive activities than they are in rural areas. 
• Participation is low in urban areas and only the poorest among eligible 
households participate. To increase the effectiveness of the programme 
in these areas, the amount and structure of the grant could be rethought. 
For example, the grant could be increased to allow households to save 
part of it. 
I. Introduction 
This paper studies the effect of the Oportunidades programme in urban areas 
in Mexico on consumption, savings, ownership of different assets, and 
transfers. Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer which was originally 
targeted to the rural poor and was subsequently extended to the majority of 
Mexican poor families, including many living in urban areas. Conditional 
cash transfer programmes have received much attention because they have 
been perceived as effective in reducing poverty and inequality. 
Studying the effects of a programme such as Oportunidades on 
consumption is important for a variety of reasons. Consumption is a 
synthetic indicator of household well-being, and therefore changes in 
consumption reflect more accurately than other variables the programme’s 
effectiveness in reducing poverty. Previous work (Angelucci, Attanasio and 
Shaw, 2005; AAS05 from now on) analysed the effect of Oportunidades on 
consumption one year after the implementation of the programme. Here, we 
consider the effects on consumption up to two years after the programme 
first started, using the data collected in 2004 on the same households 
observed in the 2002 and 2003 evaluation surveys. The dynamics of 
consumption changes are important because they will reflect both the 
perception that individual households have of the programme and its 
sustainability and because they may reflect other changes in behaviour and 
changes the programme induces in sources of income that take time to 
adjust. Indeed, the evidence from the evaluations of the rural component of 
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Oportunidades has shown that the magnitude of the programme effect in the 
first year differs from the magnitude in later years, with consumption in the 
first year being particularly unresponsive. Therefore, if we want to have a 
better sense of the size of the change in consumption and the marginal 
propensity to consume the programme transfer, it is crucial to add at least a 
second year to the time span of our analysis.  
In addition to overall consumption, we study how the grant is allocated 
between food and the rest of consumption. This is interesting for several 
reasons. One of the main justifications of cash transfers is the fact that poor 
households might have a better notion of their needs and, such needs being 
heterogeneous, might target the resources offered by the programme more 
effectively than, say, an in-kind transfer. It is therefore important to consider 
how the grant is spent.  
Food is usually considered a necessity and thus one would expect its 
share to decrease with an increase in total consumption or, more generally, 
with living standards. This would imply that food consumption should 
increase proportionally less than total expenditure. However, in the case of 
many conditional cash transfers (CCTs), including the rural component of 
Oportunidades, it has been noted that food consumption increases in the 
same proportion as, if not more than, total expenditure.1 It has been 
suggested that this effect might be driven by the fact that most CCTs are 
targeted to women and therefore change the balance of power within the 
household. This might shift expenditure shares to reflect the increased 
influence that women and their preferences might have as a consequence of 
the programme. It will be interesting to check whether similar effects are 
observed in the case of the urban component of Oportunidades.  
The magnitude of the effect of Oportunidades on consumption and its 
components is far from obvious for many other reasons. The programme 
imposes a number of conditionalities, which might affect the pattern and 
level of consumption. Moreover, and more relevantly for this paper, the 
increase in resources induced by the cash transfer might lead to several 
changes in the household budget constraint. Income might change, because 
of changes in number of children or adults’ labour supply. Transfers to and 
from other households might also change. A part of the grant might go 
towards the purchase of assets, which might change income in the future. It 
has been argued that CCTs might relax liquidity constraints and therefore 
allow poor households to invest in productive activities that were beyond 
their reach before the programme and, in that way, reduce poverty in the 
long run.  
 
1See Angelucci and Attanasio (2011) and Attanasio and Lechene (2002 and 2011) for Mexico, 
Attanasio, Battistin and Mesnard (2012) for Colombia, Schady and Rosero (2008) for Ecuador and 
Macours, Schady and Vakis (2008) for Nicaragua. 
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For all these reasons, it is important and interesting to look at the possible 
effects of the programme on the various components of the budget constraint 
faced by the treated households and to establish how they were affected by 
the programme one and two years after its introduction. This exercise allows 
us to start from the grant received and match it to different components of 
the budget constraint. Of course, we do not expect an exact correspondence, 
both because the horizon covered by the interview is not the same as that of 
the grant and because several items of the individual budget constraint  
are affected by measurement error. However, we expect a rough 
correspondence. More importantly, the changes induced by the programme 
to different components of the budget constraint can be informative about 
the mechanisms that the programme triggers.  
Therefore, in addition to consumption and its components, we study the 
impact that the transfer has on ownership of (and expenditure on) durable 
assets, some of which can be used for income-generating purposes. As the 
programme might facilitate poor households’ access to the financial system 
while at the same time increasing their overall net worth, possibly reducing 
pre-existing debts, we estimate the impact that Oportunidades has on access 
to formal banking and on the level of financial assets and debts. We also 
estimate the effect of the programme on intrahousehold transfers to take into 
account the possibility that intrahousehold relationships may change.  
The final contribution of our paper to the literature consists of studying 
the programme’s effect on the urban poor. While there is abundant evidence 
on the effect of CCT programmes on the rural poor, much less is known 
about how they affect the well-being of their urban recipients.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We start in Section II with a 
very brief description of Oportunidades and of the samples used in 
estimation. We keep the description of the rules and parameters of the 
programme to a bare minimum, as information on these can be obtained 
from AAS05 and, in more detail, from Skoufias (2005). In Section III, we 
discuss the identification and estimation of treatment effects in the context of 
the non-experimental design of our sample. We present our results in Section 
IV, which contains our main contribution. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Oportunidades: programme and data characteristics 
1. Programme features and evaluation design 
Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer programme that targets poor 
households in rural and urban areas and that consists of several components. 
As mentioned above, details of the programme’s operation can be found in 
Skoufias (2005). Here we supply some basic information. 
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The programme was started under the Zedillo administration in 1998 
under the name ‘PROGRESA’ in rural areas. Oportunidades constitutes a 
potentially important contribution to the income of eligible families. The 
most important elements of the programme are the nutrition, health and 
education components. The nutrition component consists of a cash grant for 
all treated households and an additional nutritional supplement for 
households with very young children and pregnant or lactating mothers. The 
cash transfer for food consumption was worth 155 pesos (or US$142) per 
month in the second semester of 2003 and is only conditional on the family 
regularly attending health centres. It rose slightly over time, to 160 pesos for 
the first six months of 2004 and 165 pesos for the last six months of 2004 
(i.e. around US$14). The educational grant is linked to regular attendance in 
school and depends on the grade and gender of the beneficiaries. As with the 
original programme PROGRESA, the education grant starts in the third 
grade of primary school and increases with the grade; it is higher for girls 
than for boys starting from the first grade of secondary school. Unlike 
PROGRESA, it does not stop at the last grade of secondary school but is also 
available during the three years of high school. In addition to monetary 
support, primary school children receive some school supplies at the 
beginning and in the middle of the academic year. Secondary and high 
school children receive a transfer for the acquisition of school supplies at the 
beginning of the academic year. No household can receive more than 1,445 
pesos from a combination of grants for different children. In addition to the 
monetary transfers, during the last three years of secondary school, students 
accumulate funds that are redeemable (under certain conditions) upon 
graduation from high school. For students registered since their ninth grade, 
this additional amount is about 3,000 pesos.  
The urban expansion of Oportunidades started in 2003. Before the 
beginning of the expansion, a data collection effort was started. Unlike with 
the evaluation of the rural programme in the late 1990s, the allocation of the 
programme across treatment and control areas was not random. Instead, as 
discussed in AAS05 and Todd et al. (2005), the programme was first offered 
in the blocks with the highest density of poor households. The control blocks 
– blocks that display similar characteristics to the treatment blocks where the 
programme was initially offered – were selected using a matching algorithm. 
That is, suppose that the dummy Z indicates whether a block is a treatment 
(Z = 1) or control (Z = 0) block. The programme evaluation team predicted 
the probability P(Z=1|X) that a given block would be offered the programme 
as a function of block characteristics X. It did so by estimating a propensity 
score at the block level, P(X) = P(Z=1|X). It then selected a representative 
sample of treatment blocks, matching them to a sample of control blocks 
 
2The exchange rate is approximately 10 pesos = US$1. 
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with similar values of the propensity score. A final sample of 486 treatment 
blocks and 418 control blocks was obtained.  
The data used in this paper consist of the three waves of the urban 
evaluation sample ENCELURB. The evaluation sample consists of 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ city blocks. The programme is offered to eligible 
households in treatment blocks only. The first data wave was collected in 
904 blocks in 2002, before the start of the programme in urban areas. 
Because of the non-random allocation of the programme, the availability of a 
baseline survey collected before the start of the programme is crucial to 
control for systematic pre-existing differences in the outcomes of interest 
between the treatment and control samples. The second wave was collected 
in 2003, one year after the start of the programme in urban areas. The third 
wave was conducted in 2004, two years after the start of the programme.  
Table 1 shows some features of the database. In this paper, we focus only 
on households that are eligible for the programme, which number 9,945 at 
the 2002 baseline. While we do not perform an in-depth analysis of attrition 
in our sample, we report here some information on how many households 
are lost between waves and on the rate of incomplete responses in the 
sample. In 2002, the rate of incomplete response among eligible households3 
is artificially low, as the sample does not include households that could not 
be classified as poor because they could not be interviewed or because they 
only provided incomplete information. In 2003 and 2004, a little over 1,000 
households did not provide complete information, with the rates of 
incomplete response not being dramatically different between treatment and 
control groups. Only very few eligible households are lost in 2003, while the 
number is higher in 2004,4 but reassuringly the rate of missing households is 
not substantially different between treatment and control groups. Our 
estimation sample is composed of 7,903 households for which we have data 
available, with complete responses, in all three waves. Finally, we test 
whether the probability that an eligible household could not be included in 
the final sample because of attrition is correlated with the poverty score in 
2002, which is the score variable used to decide eligibility for the 
programme. In practice, we run a regression where the dependent variable is 
a dummy that takes the value 1 for the 7,903 households for which we have 
data available and complete for all three waves and takes the value 0 
otherwise (that is, for the remaining 2,042 eligible households); the 
regressors include the poverty score and the full set of control variables as in 
Table 8. Importantly, we find that attrition is not correlated with the poverty  
 
 
3This mainly refers to households that only responded to the first part of the questionnaire, which only 
contained basic demographic questions and, importantly, did not include the consumption module. 
4In 2004, the definition of ‘lost households’ implies that they were present in both 2002 and 2003, but 
not in 2004. 
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TABLE 1 
Database featuresa 
2002 2003 2004 
C T C T C T 
Eligible (poor) households 9,945 9,934 9,192 
3,634 6,311 3,628 6,306 3,409 5,783 
      
With incomplete responses 88 1,178 1,046 
Percentage of eligibleb 0.74%  0.97%  12.57% 11.45% 12.50% 10.72%  
      
Lost in follow-upsc   11 742 
Percentage of eligibled   0.17%  0.08%  6.12%  8.29%  
      
Households with data  7,903     
available in all 3 wavese 2,848 5,055     
      
p-value of poverty score in 
‘attrition’ regressionf 
0.3970     
aC = control group and T = treatment group. 
bPercentage of control and treatment group in each wave. 
cThe figure for 2003 refers to households present in 2002 but missing in 2003. The figure for 2004 refers 
to households present in 2002 and 2003 but missing in 2004. 
dPercentage of eligible households in 2002 for values in 2003. Percentage of eligible households in 2003 
for values in 2004. 
eThe figure excludes households with incomplete responses. 
fThe ‘attrition’ regression is a regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if 
the household has available and complete data in all three waves (that is, for 7,903 households) and 0 
otherwise (that is, for 9,945–7,903 = 2,042 households). In addition to the poverty score, the regression 
includes a full set of controls as in Table 8. Results are robust to different specifications with different 
sets of controls.  
 
score (we report the p-value of the poverty score coefficient in Table 1); 
therefore selection out of the sample should not be a concern for the 
potential bias and interpretation of our treatment effects.5 
As discussed in AAS05, the treatment sample is not a representative one. 
In particular, participants in the programme were oversampled. Fortunately, 
it is possible to reconstruct the proportion of participants in the treatment 
areas using a census survey in the same areas, which was used as a screen to 
identify poor and participant households for the urban evaluation sample. 
These true proportions allow us to compute the appropriate weights to obtain 
the effect of the programme.6 All the descriptive statistics and the estimated 
impacts that follow are computed using these weights.  
In addition to the oversampling of participants in treatment blocks, an 
additional modification of the sampling frame was introduced. In some 
blocks, even after sampling all participants, it was perceived that the number 
of the latter was too small. This situation led to the inclusion in the sample of 
 
5Full results of this regression are not shown but can be provided upon request. 
6For details of the construction of these weights, see Appendix A, available online at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fssep12_angeluccietal_appendices.pdf. 





© 2012 The Authors 
Fiscal Studies © 2012 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
adjacent blocks, which are described as barrido or ‘swept’. A problem with 
the barrido blocks is that there is no census sample for them. This implies 
that we cannot observe the proportion of participants among eligible 
households in these blocks. Indeed, only participating eligible households 
from barrido blocks were included. In computing the weights, we impute to 
each barrido block the participation rate of the adjacent regular blocks. To 
check robustness, we compute all our results including and excluding the 
barrido blocks. The full results are available upon request. 
2. Data characteristics 
In Table 2, we report the programme participation rate and the average 
amounts received by treated households, according to the administrative 
data, in 2003 and 2004. The participation rates are computed using 
administrative data, rather than self-reported participation. The first striking 
feature of this table is the relatively low participation rate, especially if 
compared with the rural programme, whose participation rate was greater 
than 90 per cent. Just over half the eligible households participate in the 
programme. Moreover, the proportion barely increases between 2003 and 
2004. The distribution of payment is skewed, with the mean payment being 
above the median. It should be noted that the annual averages mask a 
substantial amount of variation over the year, as the educational grants are 
typically not paid when the school is in recess, from July to August. 
Tables 3 to 7 report some descriptive statistics for our sample. All the 
results in these tables are computed weighting participants and non-
participants differently so as to take into account the choice-based nature of 
our sample. We consider eligible households only – that is, those households 
with a sufficiently high poverty level to qualify for the programme. These 
households encompass programme participants and non-participants. The 
tables show household characteristics in 2002, unless otherwise specified, 
for households in treatment and control blocks. This year is our baseline, 
before the beginning of the programme. Table 3 shows the proportions of 
households with different education levels and employment statuses and  
 
TABLE 2 
Programme participation and amount of transfer 
2003 2004 
Percentage of treated households in treatment areas  51.8 53.9 
Mean amount received (monthly)  358 436 
Median amount received (monthly)  275 339 
Notes: Averages are weighted to account for the choice-based nature of the sample. The mean and median 
amounts received are for treated households only. The transfer value is in nominal pesos. The exchange 
rate is approximately 10 pesos = US$1.  
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their mean income.7 Details of expenditures and asset ownership are given in 
Table 4, of savings in Table 5 and of transfers in Table 6. We also report, for 
each variable, a test of equality of means between treatment and control 
blocks.  
TABLE 3 
Eligible households’ education, income and employment at baseline (2002) 
C T p-value 
Proportion of households where     
head is literate  0.809 0.766 0.000 
partner is literate  0.800 0.750 0.000 
at least one child goes to school  0.924 0.914 0.183 
at least one child works  0.074 0.125 0.000 
   
Proportion of households with     
head with no education  0.179 0.234 0.000 
head with primary education  0.550 0.529 0.125 
head with secondary education  0.217 0.186 0.006 
head with higher education  0.051 0.050 0.765 
   
partner with no education  0.169 0.176 0.600 
partner with primary education  0.585 0.584 0.978 
partner with secondary education  0.208 0.197 0.431 
partner with higher education  0.036 0.040 0.530 
   
Mean income of     
household  3,686 3,137 0.008 
household in 2001  2,303 2,266 0.602 
household in 2000  2,109 1,978 0.091 
household in 1999  2,181 1,762 0.000 
   
head  1,918 1,860 0.379 
partner  717 427 0.044 
   
Proportion of households with     
institutional transfers in 2001  0.266 0.268 0.858 
head employed  0.661 0.662 0.965 
partner employed  0.172 0.221 0.024 
head self-employed  0.200 0.213 0.349 
partner self-employed  0.100 0.160 0.000 
head or partner working in 2001  0.873 0.887 0.225 
Notes: C = control blocks and T = treatment blocks. Averages are weighted to account for the choice-




7These statistics were computed trimming the bottom and top 1 per cent of income, to avoid the 
influence of extreme outliers. 
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TABLE 4 
Eligible households’ consumption and asset ownership at baseline (2002) 
C T p-value 
Mean value of monthly non-durable expenditure for     
total  2,149 1,836 0.000 
food  1,299 1,149 0.001 
non-food  849 687 0.000 
   
Proportion with zero expenditure for     
furniture  0.95 0.96 0.004 
improvement to the house  0.95 0.93 0.006 
home utensils  0.94 0.94 0.302 
domestic appliances  0.97 0.96 0.001 
vehicles  0.99 0.98 0.046 
   
Mean value of annual expenditure for     
furniture  6.80 6.80 0.909 
improvement to the house  11.40 13.20 0.223 
home utensils  1.74 1.43 0.009 
domestic appliances  7.53 8.68 0.199 
vehicles  0.60 1.23 0.000 
   
Proportion of households owning     
propertiesa  0.043 0.051 0.333 
vehiclesb  0.039 0.019 0.000 
appliancesc 0.75 0.735 0.562 
electricsd 0.913 0.894 0.018 
animalse  0.104 0.106 0.815 
aHouses, land, etc. in addition to the house where the household lives. 
bCars, trucks, motorbikes, tractors and other motor vehicles. 
cFridges, heaters, washing and drying machines, boilers and tankers. 
dTV sets, radios, VCRs and other devices such as PCs or microwave ovens. 
eUsed for work and/or consumption. 
Notes: C = control blocks and T = treatment blocks. Averages are weighted to account for the choice-
based nature of the sample. Monetary values are nominal. All expenditure values in the table include 
zeros. 
 
The main conclusion from inspecting these tables is that households in 
treatment blocks are generally poorer and more vulnerable than households 
in control blocks. The difference between poverty and vulnerability is that, 
while poverty is an ex-post measure of household well-being, vulnerability is 
related to the likelihood of being poor in the future or to the effect of large 
negative income shocks. We provide more details consistent with these 
statements in the remainder of this section.  
We consider the following proxies for poverty and vulnerability:8 
education, child labour, consumption, asset ownership and balance sheet. 
The higher poverty among households in treatment blocks is expected, as it 
 
8Naturally, there is a degree of overlap between proxies for poverty and for vulnerability. 
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corresponds to the criterion for the selection of such blocks. For example, 
Table 3 shows that the proportion of literate household heads is more than 4 
percentage points higher in control than in treatment areas. Child labour 
seems to be considerably more common in treatment areas. Total household 
income is significantly higher in control areas in 1999, in 2000 (marginally 
so) and in 2002. Moreover, spouses (partners) are more likely to work in 
treatment areas than in control areas, although they earn less in treatment 
areas. 
Table 4 reports statistics for non-durable and durable expenditures and 
asset ownership.9 Consistent with the findings from the previous table, 
control households exhibit considerably higher levels of consumption. 
Durable expenditures do not seem very informative, as hardly any 
households have made any purchases in the considered time span (which 
varies between 1 and 12 months for different commodities). It is more useful 
to compare the rates of asset ownership, which, when statistically different, 
tend to be higher for households in control blocks.  
Table 5 looks at different types of savings. All the figures in this table 
refer to stocks and, in computing the averages, we include households with  
 
TABLE 5 
Eligible households’ savings at baseline (2002) 
C T p-value 
Proportion of households that     
contracted loans  0.124 0.240 0.000 
have a bank account  0.007 0.010 0.032 
have savings  0.018 0.035 0.000 
have had savings in the last 12 months 0.021 0.044 0.000 
   
Mean value of     
savings  53.6 64.6 0.585 
debts  388 600 0.000 
   
Proportion of loans (out of total loans 
solicited) solicited to 
   
savings bank  0.082 0.037 0.045 
government programme 0.011 0.021 0.070 
tandaa  0.002 0.009 0.000 
moneylender  0.155 0.157 0.945 
relative or friend  0.693 0.625 0.039 
other  0.054 0.140 0.000 
aThis is a rotating credit association. 
Notes: C = control blocks and T = treatment blocks. Averages are weighted to account for the choice-
based nature of the sample. Monetary values are nominal.  
 
9Non-durable consumption is defined as monthly expenditure on all the commodities on which we 
have information. As questions about different non-food commodities refer to different time horizons, 
before forming the non-food aggregate we convert all the figures into monthly flows. 
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TABLE 6 
Eligible households’ transfers at baseline (2002), 
excluding households with zero transfers 
C T p-value 
Proportion of households that     
sent transfersa 0.041 0.063 0.000 
sent monetary transfers  0.015 0.027 0.000 
sent in-kind transfers  0.027 0.041 0.003 
   
received transfersa 0.081 0.164 0.000 
received monetary transfers  0.033 0.069 0.000 
received in-kind transfers  0.056 0.119 0.000 
   
Monetary transfers sent    
total  1,613 1,196 0.133 
to the same municipality  275 523 0.020 
out of the municipality  1,338 673 0.010 
   
Monetary transfers received    
total  3,707 2,757 0.010 
from the same municipality  303 675 0.029 
from outside the municipality  3,404 2,082 0.005 
   
from spouse  1,244 1,519 0.379 
from offspring  1,551 551 0.014 
from parent  120 97 0.563 
from other relative  652 414 0.434 
from non-relative  305 162 0.198 
   
In-kind transfers sent    
total  384 263 0.442 
to the same municipality  134 222 0.338 
out of the municipality  250 41 0.226 
   
In-kind transfers received     
total  430 340 0.198 
from the same municipality  232 247 0.322 
from outside the municipality  198 93 0.092 
   
from spouse  1.5 10 0.000 
from offspring  67 74 0.853 
from parent  91 39 0.357 
from other relative  278 201 0.340 
from non-relative  197 222 0.438 
aMonetary, in kind or both. 
Notes: C = control blocks and T = treatment blocks. Averages are weighted to account for the choice-
based nature of the sample. Monetary values are nominal.  
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TABLE 7 
Eligible households’ transfers at baseline (2002), 
including households with zero transfers 
C T p-value 
Monetary transfers sent     
total  25 29 0.478 
to the same municipality  4 12 0.000 
out of the municipality  21 16 0.312 
   
Monetary transfers received     
total  113 187 0.014 
from the same municipality  9 39 0.000 
from outside the municipality  104 148 0.150 
   
from spouse  36 106 0.000 
from offspring  45 40 0.766 
from parent  3 5 0.189 
from other relative  19 23 0.670 
from non-relative  9 10 0.655 
   
In-kind transfers sent     
total  7 8 0.851 
to the same municipality  2 6 0.072 
out of the municipality  5 1 0.360 
   
In-kind transfers received     
total  23 38 0.012 
from the same municipality  13 28 0.000 
from outside the municipality  11 10 0.891 
   
from spouse  0.05 0.57 0.003 
from offspring  3 5 0.014 
from parent  3 3 0.882 
from other relative  10 14 0.487 
from non-relative  7 19 0.003 
   
Monetary net transfersa (received–sent)    
total  1,991 1,682 0.332 
same municipality  367 837 0.146 
from outside the municipality  2,711 2,210 0.188 
   
In-kind net transfersa (received–sent)     
total  318 312 0.942 
same municipality  290 272 0.737 
from outside the municipality  325 382 0.792 
aDoes not include households with zero for both received and sent transfers.  
Notes: C = control blocks and T = treatment blocks. Averages are weighted to account for the choice-
based nature of the sample. Monetary values are nominal.  
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zero amounts. In particular, we consider the proportion of households that 
hold different types of assets (or liabilities) and the mean values of savings 
and of debts. Treatment households are more likely to hold debt, but also to 
have savings. The average level of debts is 600 pesos for treatment 
households and only 388 pesos for control households, and the average value 
of savings is also higher for treatment households (but not significantly so) 
and at very low levels (around 60 pesos). That is, households in treatment 
blocks have lower income and consumption, fewer assets and more 
liabilities.  
We can use the data from Tables 4 and 5 to compare the ratio of assets to 
liabilities for the two groups of households. While we cannot actually 
compute this ratio, as we do not have the monetary value of the assets owned 
by households, it is likely that the ratio is higher for control households, as 
they own more assets, have higher income and hold fewer liabilities. This 
comparison suggests that households in treatment blocks are more 
vulnerable to negative shocks. 
Tables 6 and 7 consider transfers to and from households, both monetary 
and in kind. Table 6 does not include households with zero transfers, while 
Table 7 does. Transfers refer to interpersonal transfers received or sent  
over the last 12 months, so they do not include the programme’s transfers. 
Treatment households are considerably more likely both to send and to 
receive transfers (both monetary and in kind) than control households. When 
we consider total net transfers (see bottom part of Table 7), the differences 
between treatment and control households are less pronounced, whereas 
some differences arise in monetary net transfers both within the same 
municipality and outside the municipality.  
III. Identification and estimation of programme impacts 
1. Identification 
We are interested in identifying two parameters: the average intention to 
treat (AIT) and the average treatment on the treated (ATT) effects. The AIT 
is a useful policy parameter because it measures the average programme 
effect on the subjects who are offered the treatment.  
Our identification strategy relies on observing households living in two 
groups of similar blocks, only one of which is offered the treatment. Our key 
assumption is that, conditional on observables, block type is a valid 
instrument.  
We define blocks where the programme is offered to poor households  
(Z = 1) as ‘treatment blocks’ and blocks where the programme is not 
implemented (Z = 0) as ‘control blocks’. We observe outcomes for 
households in both block types at time t1, almost one and two years after the 
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implementation of Oportunidades, and at time t0, prior to the start of the 
programme. The treatment consists of participation in Oportunidades. The 
variable Z is our instrument. Potential outcomes for household i at time t1 are 
1
(1)itY  in the presence of the treatment ( 1 1itD = ) and 1 (0)itY  without the 
treatment (
1
0itD = ). The relationship between potential and observed 
outcomes is 
1 1 1 1 1
(1) (0)(1 ).it it it it itY Y D Y D= + −  We express potential 
participation of household i at time t1 as a function of the instrument: 1 (1)itD  
is potential participation where the household lives in a treatment block and 
1
(0)itD  is potential participation if living in a control block. Participation is 
zero by definition in control blocks, as the programme is not implemented 
there, i.e. 
1
(0) 0itD = . Therefore, the relationship between observed and 
potential outcomes is 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(1) (0)(1 ) (1) .it it it it it it itD D Z D Z D Z= + − =   
Given this notation, the following equation defines the average treatment 
effect on the treated:  
 
1 1 1
(1) (0) | (1) 1 .it it itATT E Y Y D⎡ ⎤= − =⎣ ⎦  
This notation implicitly assumes that potential outcomes for each subject are 
not affected by the treatment status of others, an assumption usually referred 
to in the literature as the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), 
formalised by Rubin (1980 and 1986). Our key identification assumption is 
that, conditional on a set of observable characteristics measured in a pre-
programme time period t = t0, 0 ,itX  the area of residence is independent of 
the potential treatment 
1
(1)itD  and 1 (0)itD  and of the change in potential 
outcomes 
1 0
(1) (1) (1)it it itY Y YΔ = −  and 1 0(0) (0) (0),it it itY Y YΔ = −  i.e. 
1 1 0
(0) (1) (0) (1) .i it it it it itZ Y Y D D X⊥ Δ ,Δ , , |  That is, we allow residents of 
treatment and control blocks to have different levels of potential outcomes, 
but the differences are assumed to be time-invariant; therefore the 
differences disappear by taking their first difference.10 Z has a positive causal 
effect on participation, i.e. 
1
(1) 0.itE D⎡ ⎤ >⎣ ⎦   
 
10One can express potential outcomes as two separate terms, one a function of X and the other of Z, 
with the latter term being time-invariant and constant across both potential outcomes: 
1
( )itY J =
1
( ) ( ),it iY J X U Z, +  with J = {0,1}. 1 0( ) ( ) ( ).it it itY J Y J X Y J XΔ = , − ,  Note that 0 0(1 ) (0 )it itY X Y X, = ,  
because the treatment has not started in t = t0. Therefore, 1 1 1 1(1) (0) (1 ) (0 )it it it itY Y Y X Y X− = , − ,  and 
1 1
(1) (0) (1) (0).it it it itY Y Y YΔ − Δ = −  
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From the above assumptions, and dropping the subscripts for expositional 
ease, it follows that  
[ ] [ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ] ( ) [ ] [ ]
[ ] ( )
| 1, | 0,
(1) (1) (0) 1 (1) | 1, (0) | 0,
(1) (0) | (1) 1, (1) 1| (0) | (0) |
(1) (0) | (1) 1, 1| 1, .
E Y Z X E Y Z X
E Y D Y D Z X E Y Z X
E Y Y D X P D X E Y X E Y X
E Y Y D X P D Z X
Δ = − Δ =
= Δ +Δ − = − Δ =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= Δ −Δ = = + Δ − Δ
= − = = =
 
The last equality follows from SUTVA and from the conditional 
independence of Z from potential treatment, P(D(1)=1|X) = P(D(1)=1|Z=1,X) 
= P(D=1|Z=1,X). Thus the ATT for individuals with characteristics X, ATTX, 
can be estimated as the ratio between the expected difference in observed 
outcomes in treatment and control areas and the observed probability of 
participation in treatment areas. We can express this as a function of the 
propensity score P(X) = P(Z=1|X):11  
 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
( )
( ) (1) (0) (1) 1 ( )
1 ( ) 0 ( )
.
1 1 ( )
P XATT E Y Y D P X
E Y Z P X E Y Z P X
P D Z P X
= − | = ,
Δ | = , − Δ | = ,
=
= | = ,
 
If we further assume common support, i.e. P(Z=1|X) < 1, then the ATT is  
 ( ) ( 1).P X ppATT ATT dF p D== | =∫  
With this approach, one normally identifies the local average treatment 
effect (LATE), i.e. the average treatment effect for the set of agents who are 
induced to participate in the programme because of the instrument. In this 
particular case, though, our subjects consist only of ‘never-takers’ (D(1) = 
D(0) = 0) and ‘takers’ (D(1) = 1 and D(0) = 0), as we have neither ‘always-
takers’ nor ‘defiers’ (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). Therefore the 
subjects who are induced to participate in the programme because they are 
offered the treatment are all the treated subjects (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). 
This estimator is a conditional version of the Bloom estimator (Bloom, 1984; 
Heckman, 1996), where the availability of the treatment is not random, 
unlike in the other papers mentioned.  
The numerator of ATTP(X) is the average intention to treat for individuals 
with a given value of the propensity score P(X). The AIT measures the effect 
of the programme on eligible subjects, regardless of whether they participate 
 
11Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983. 
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in it. Since the policymaker often has little influence on participation, the 
AIT is one of the relevant parameters for policy analysis.  
The AIT is also interesting because it provides a lower bound to the 
average treatment effect on the treated.12 In addition, identifying the  
AIT requires less restrictive identification assumptions than needed for 
identifying the ATT, as it effectively ignores the issue of what determines 
participation in the programme.  
In our case, the AIT is identified under the assumptions that the 
programme has no effect in control areas, that the changes in potential 
consumption in treatment and control areas are independent of areas of 
residence, conditional on observables, and that there is full common support, 
P(Z=1|X) < 1. Since only about half of the eligible households enrolled in the 
programme and spillover effects from participants to eligible non-
participants are unlikely, we expect the AIT to be substantially smaller than 
the ATT. For example, if the programme effect were homogeneous, the AIT 
would be half the magnitude of the ATT in the absence of spillover effects.  
Neither parameter is identified if the programme affects the consumption 
of poor households in control blocks. However, such effects are unlikely to 
occur, given the geographic distance from the Oportunidades blocks. To 
identify the ATT, we further require no indirect programme effect for 
eligible non-participants. While Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) find a 10 
per cent increase in consumption for non-participating households in treated 
rural villages, we believe that these effects are unlikely in urban areas for 
two reasons. First, the treated areas in rural Mexico are very small villages, 
with a median size of about 50 households, and most households are treated. 
Urban areas, on the contrary, are larger and the share of treated households is 
much lower. Therefore both the likelihood that treated households may share 
their transfers with eligible non-participants and the average amount shared 
are going to be much lower. Second, while the households that indirectly 
benefit from the programme in rural areas are not eligible for it, those in 
urban areas are actually eligible for the programme but do not participate. 
Thus, it is unlikely that they would receive transfers from treated 
households, given that they could enrol in the programme and receive the 
unconditional income support even if they chose to send no children to 
school. We also rule out any general equilibrium effects on prices, wages or 
labour supply, based on the evidence from rural areas, where there are no 
such effects.13  
 
12The lower bound refers to a positive ATT, and further assumes that any effect of the treatment on 
eligible non-participants is smaller than the one on participants. See Hirano et al. (2000) for an 
application in which this latter assumption is violated. 
13Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009. 
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The other identification assumptions – the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) and common support – depend on the set of conditioning 
variables. Therefore we will discuss them in the next subsection.  
2. Estimation issues 
Before estimating the programme effects on consumption, it is important to 
check whether, given the variables we use to estimate the propensity score, 
there is a sufficiently large number of control households for each treatment 
household and whether the CIA and SUTVA are credible.  
We follow Angelucci and Attanasio (2009) to address the various 
estimation issues. In particular, they show that control and treatment blocks 
are not balanced geographically, and indeed the areas from which these 
blocks are sampled have different local business cycles. Therefore, it is 
especially important to control for pre-programme macroeconomic variables 
as well as individual ones.  
The presence of common support is a testable assumption; therefore we 
proceed to see whether it is maintained in our data. We estimate the 
propensity score, P(X) = P(Z=1|X), at the household level by probit using a 
wide set of observable characteristics in 2002 or earlier years. The dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether the household is resident in a block 
where the programme is offered (Z = 1) or not. The conditioning variables 
we use are meant to capture systematic differences between treatment and 
control blocks before the programme started. They include both individual- 
and household-level variables (such as family composition and education) 
and area-level variables. In particular, the variables we use are (using 2002 
values, unless otherwise specified): household size dummies; number of 
children by age categories (0 to 5, 6 to 12, 13 to 15, and 16 to 20 years) and 
by age category and school attendance; wealth index as a second-order 
polynomial (programme eligibility is based on this index); income (as a 
second-order polynomial); savings (excluding those of domestic helpers and 
their relatives, and of individuals whose relationship to other family 
members is missing) and debt; transitory shocks in 2002 such as death or 
illness of a non-resident family member, job or business loss for a resident 
family member, and whether the household suffered a natural disaster; 
doctor visits in the previous four weeks for children, head and spouse (as 
three separate dummies); household head’s and spouse’s presence (including 
multiple heads), gender, education dummies (the categories are no 
qualification – the excluded category – incomplete primary, complete 
primary, incomplete secondary, complete secondary, higher education) and 
employment status in 2002 (employee or self-employed; the excluded 
category is unemployed); dummies for whether either head or spouse  
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TABLE 8 
Probit estimates of the propensity score: marginal effects 
P(Z=1|X)   P(Z=1|X) 
numkids0-5  0.017 
(0.020) 
 ptremployee  0.107*** 
(0.027) 
numkids6-12  –0.008 
(0.027) 
 ptrse 0.117*** 
(0.031) 
numkids13-15  –0.011 
(0.022) 
 hhinc  0.006 
(0.004) 
numkids16-20  –0.024 
(0.016) 
 hhincsq –0.00001 
(0.00001) 
numsch0-5  0.004 
(0.020) 
 hhinc01  0.003** 
(0.001) 
numsch6-12  0.0004 
(0.021) 
 hhinc00  –0.001 
(0.003) 
numsch13-15  0.002 
(0.027) 
 hhinc99  –0.001 
(0.001) 
numsch16-20  –0.021 
(0.027) 
 hhworked01  0.010 
(0.031) 
sfem  0.122*** 
(0.034) 
 hhworked00  0.005 
(0.032) 
nopartner  0.041 
(0.040) 
 hhworked99  0.067** 
(0.034) 
hoheduc-1  –0.055* 
(0.032) 
 savings 0.001 
(0.006) 
hoheduc-2  –0.107*** 
(0.039) 
 debt  0.002 
(0.002) 
hoheduc-3  –0.049 
(0.044) 
 death  0.050* 
(0.027) 
hoheduc-4  –0.115** 
(0.055) 
 unemp  0.127*** 
(0.032) 
hoheduc-5  –0.179** 
(0.077) 
 bust  –0.193** 
(0.089) 
ptreduc-1  0.136*** 
(0.037) 
 disaster  0.176*** 
(0.067) 
ptreduc-2  0.120*** 
(0.039) 
 wealth  –0.137*** 
(0.045) 
ptreduc-3  0.170*** 
(0.043) 
 wealthsq  0.006 
(0.011) 
ptreduc-4  0.123*** 
(0.037) 
 GDP00  –14.37*** 
(2.800) 
ptreduc-5  0.173*** 
(0.043) 
 GDP01  0.260 
(3.706) 
hohemployee  0.082** 
(0.041) 





Area characteristics: No 
Household size dummies: Yes 
Doctor visit dummies: Yes 
Income joint significance: 14.84*** 
Observations: 8,324 
Notes: See next page. 
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Notes to Table 8 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses; clustering at the locality level. */**/*** means 
significant at 10/5/1 per cent level. hh = household; hoh = head of household; ptr = partner (e.g. 
hhworked01 is a dummy for whether the household head or spouse was employed in 2001). Unless 
otherwise specified, all variables are from 2002. A more detailed variable description is given in the 
online appendix, available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fssep12_angeluccietal_appendices.pdf.  
 
 
worked in 1999, 2000 and 2001; and income of head and partner in 1999, 
2000 and 2001 (as a linear term). Lastly, we add state annual GDP growth in 
2000, 2001 and 2002 to control for differential trends between treatment and 
control blocks.  
We show the estimated marginal effects of the propensity score in Table 
8. These confirm that treatment blocks are poorer than control blocks, as the 
households living in treatment blocks have lower wealth, a larger share of 
uneducated household heads (the excluded category), and a higher likelihood 
of suffering from transitory shocks (except loss of business) and of being 
headed by females without a partner, normally associated with high 
indigence. Interestingly, though, residents of treatment blocks also have 
higher employment rates (both as employees and self-employed), higher 
education for the spouse of the household head and income no different from  
 
FIGURE 1 
The propensity score 
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that of residents of control blocks (with the exception of 2001 income, which 
is higher in treatment blocks), conditional on the other observable 
characteristics. Lastly, treatment and control blocks have different state GDP 
growth rates, confirming that they are not balanced at the geographic level. 
In sum, this table shows the need to rebalance the observables between 
treatment and control blocks. 
Figure 1 shows that the common support is complete – that is, for each 
household in the Oportunidades blocks, we have a sufficiently high number 
of close matches from control blocks. Full common support ensures we can 
compute average treatment effects for the entire sample of eligible and 
treated households, respectively, and not only for non-random subgroups of 
families.  
We now provide indirect evidence in favour of our conditional 
independence and absence of spillover effects assumptions (CIA and 
SUTVA). While these identification assumptions are not directly testable, 
the evidence provided below supports our conjecture that the CIA holds, 
given the chosen set of conditioning variables, and that there are no indirect 
effects of Oportunidades on non-participating households’ consumption.  
The main issue for the CIA validity is whether we have successfully 
controlled for differential trends between treatment and control blocks, since 
our difference-in-difference approach controls for time-invariant unobserved 
differences. The evaluation surveys contain retrospective information on 
income, covering several years. This allows us to check whether there are 
differential trends in income before the introduction of the programme 
between treatment and control areas.14 While we do not report these results 
here, we identify some differences in pre-2003 income and female 
employment growth between treatment and control areas. We suspect that 
these differential trends depend on the lack of geographic balance between 
treatment and control blocks, which come from different states. To address 
this issue, our set of conditioning variables includes state GDP growth for 
2000, 2001 and 2002.  
Adding state GDP growth to the set of variables we use to estimate the 
propensity score has a sizeable effect on the estimated treatment effects. We 
show this by estimating the average treatment effect on the change in the log 
of consumption for the non-poor, alternatively adding and omitting pre-
programme state GDP growth. Since these households are not eligible for 
the programme, we expect the treatment effect to be zero. This is exactly 
what we find when we condition on GDP growth: Table 9 shows that the 
effect of Oportunidades on the non-poor’s log of consumption is –0.010 and 
not statistically significant (column 1). However, when we fail to control for 
the difference in GDP growth, we estimate a positive, significant and large  
 
 
14See also Angelucci and Attanasio (2009). 
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TABLE 9 
Average treatment effect on log-consumption for the non-poor 
Log-consumption 
(1) (2) 




GDP growth  Yes No 
 
Observations  3,528 
Notes: Standard errors estimated with the block-bootstrap (1,000 replications). The block is the city 
block. */**/*** means significant at 10/5/1 per cent level.  
 
treatment effect: consumption appears to be about 15 per cent higher for the 
non-poor in treatment areas (column 2). This exercise also indirectly 
validates the SUTVA: the estimate in column 1 suggests that, given the 
chosen set of conditioning variables, there are no spillover effects of the 
programme among the non-poor living in treatment blocks.  
IV. The impact of Oportunidades on consumption, wealth and 
transfers 
In this section, we first present the results obtained applying the methods 
described in the previous section to several different outcomes. We then 
briefly discuss our interpretation of the findings.  
1. Results 
According to the estimates in Table 10, the main effect of the programme on 
treated households is an increase in food consumption by 169 and 283 pesos 
in 2003 and 2004. The effect on non-durable, non-food consumption is  
 
TABLE 10 
Average treatment effects of Oportunidades on non-durable consumption 
Food Non-food 
2003 2004 2003 2004 
















    
Observations 7,322 6,824 7,320 6,829 
Notes: Local linear regression (llr) matching estimates. The estimates from llr are similar to the ones 
obtained using the five nearest neighbours with replacement. The AIT effects are estimated using 
standard propensity score matching. Standard errors obtained from the block-bootstrap with 500 
replications. The block is the city block. */**/*** means significant at 10/5/1 per cent level. Monetary 
values are nominal. 
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negative and insignificant in 2003, and positive and insignificant in 2004. 
Summing the estimated effects for food and non-food consumption in the 
first two years of the programme, the total amount spent on non-durable 
consumption is about 68 per cent of the average transfer size. The share of 
the transfer consumed, however, seems to vary over time. Indeed, while non-
durable consumption is considerably smaller than the average transfer in 
2003, in 2004 one cannot reject the hypothesis that all the transfer is 
consumed.  
Table 11 shows the estimated treatment effects on durable expenditures. 
These effects are positive and significant, but small, averaging about 5 pesos 
per month. We interpret these results as evidence that most of the effect of 
the treatment on consumption is on non-durable, rather than durable, goods. 
This pattern of findings – the size of the effect on consumption growing over 
time, with the bulk of the effect being on non-durable and in particular food 
consumption – is similar to the results from the evaluation of the rural 
component of the programme.  
Overall, the results on consumption suggest that the eligible households 
that participate in the programme may be saving part of the transfer in 2003, 
but they seem to be spending a larger amount in 2004. This result can be 
explained by the fact that in 2003 beneficiaries were not sure about the 
continuation of the programme. Moreover, at the programme’s inception, 
payment might have been irregular and plagued by delays.  
Notice that the ATT is not simply obtained by dividing the AIT by the 
participation rate. As we mentioned in Section III, we compute the AIT and 
the corresponding ATT for a given set of Xs and then aggregate. This 
averaging explains why, for instance, the AIT on non-food non-durable 
consumption is –58 in 2003 while the ATT is –57 (although neither figure is 
significantly different from zero).  
We now look at the effect of the programme on savings and loans. Table 
12 shows programme effects on the probability of having savings and 
loans/debts, and the respective amounts, while Table 13 provides 
information on the probability of having a bank account and on the number 
of loans requested. Despite a small increase in the likelihood of having 
savings in both years, and positive effects on the likelihood of having a bank 
account, we find no effects on the amounts of savings in either year. Instead, 
while there is no change in the number of loans asked for (coefficients are 
significant but very small), we estimate a considerable decrease in debts, 
both in the proportion of households holding one and in the amounts. The 
decrease in loans for participants, of roughly 350 pesos in 2003 and 990 
pesos in 2004, might be considered implausibly large. However, it should be 
stressed that the loan is a stock rather than a flow and that therefore the 
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transfer that we have mentioned so far, but with the total amount received up 
to 2003 and up to 2004. The average beneficiary family in 2003 had received 
3,792 pesos, and in 2004 the cumulative average was 8,196 pesos, using 
2002 prices. The declines of 350 and 990 pesos therefore imply that about 8–
10 per cent of the grant was used to repay debts.  
This number is not inconsistent with the evidence we have presented on 
consumption, where the point estimates indicated that part of the grant was 
saved in 2003 and that most of the grant was consumed in 2004.  
TABLE 13 
Effect of Oportunidades on bank accounts and loans 
Probability of having a bank account Number of loans requested 
2003 2004 2003 2004 
















Notes: Local linear regression (llr) matching estimates. The estimates from llr are similar to the ones 
obtained using the five nearest neighbours with replacement. The AIT effects are estimated using 
standard propensity score matching. Standard errors obtained from the block-bootstrap with 500 
replications. The block is the city block. */**/*** means significant at 10/5/1 per cent level. Monetary 
values are nominal. The number of observations is 7,890 for 2003 and 7,885 for 2004. 
 
TABLE 14 
Effect of Oportunidades on transfers 
Proportion of households 
Monetary In kind 
Sent Received Sent Received 
2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  
































Average transfers (including zero) 
Monetary In kind 
Sent Received Sent Received 
2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  
































Notes: Local linear regression (llr) matching estimates. The estimates from llr are similar to the ones 
obtained using the five nearest neighbours with replacement. The AIT effects are estimated using 
standard propensity score matching. Standard errors obtained from the block-bootstrap with 500 
replications. The block is the city block. */**/*** means significant at 10/5/1 per cent level. Monetary 
values are nominal. The number of observations is 7,890 for 2003 and 7,885 for 2004. 
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An additional explanation for these observed lower loans is that they are 
partly a form of crowding out of private transfers, as informal loans from 
family and friends may be types of transfers used to insure against risk.  
Table 14 provides estimates of the programme effect on transfers. We 
include in the sample households with both positive and zero transfers. 
While Oportunidades does not affect monetary transfers (with the exception 
of a weakly significant 41 peso drop in transfers sent in 2004), the 
programme causes a drop in the receipt of in-kind transfers in 2004: treated 
households are about 10 percentage points less likely to receive transfers in 
both years, and the amount of in-kind transfers received has a significant 
drop of 69 pesos in 2004. Like Albarran and Attanasio (2003) in the case of 
rural PROGRESA, we find some evidence of crowding out for private 
transfers. This reduction, however, is quite modest and limited to in-kind 
transfers.  
2. Interpretation 
The picture that emerges from these results is reasonably clear. Urban 
Oportunidades increases consumption. The increase is substantially larger  
in the second year than in the first. This evidence is consistent with the 
evidence from other programmes and probably reflects that in the first year 
households might have had doubts about the continuation of the programme 
and there might have been logistical difficulties that meant that grant 
payments were sometimes delayed.  
As in most CCTs, most of the increase in consumption is on food. As we 
mentioned in the introduction, this might reflect a shift in the relative 
weights that husbands and wives have in the allocation of resources within 
the household. The fact that the share of food does not decrease (and if 
anything increases) with the increase in total expenditure conflicts with the 
notion that food is a necessity and it probably reflects a shift in household 
preferences.  
In terms of magnitudes, we estimate that after two years, households are 
spending about 68 per cent of the grant. This is even lower than the 75 per 
cent spent in rural areas and implies that other components of the budget 
constraint have changed. The evidence we have reported here seems to 
indicate that Oportunidades households have considerably reduced their 
indebtedness. At the same time, they have increased their access to the 
formal financial system: we register a non-negligible increase in the 
proportion of households that have a bank account.  
As for crowding out of private transfers, we find only limited evidence of 
a reduction in private transfers to the beneficiary households. Therefore  
there do not seem to be spillovers of the Oportunidades grant through this 
channel.  
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A final important issue that needs to be kept in mind is the limited 
participation of eligible households in the programme in urban areas. This 
feature, discussed at length in Angelucci and Attanasio (2011), from a 
statistical point of view means that there is a large difference between AIT 
and ATT. However, from a substantive point of view it is an indication of 
the fact that the programme is probably much less attractive to potential 
urban beneficiaries than to their rural counterparts. This difference in the 
attractiveness of the programme is probably also reflected in the use to 
which programme beneficiaries put the grant.  
V. Conclusions 
In this paper, we report some results on the effects of the Oportunidades 
programme on consumption, savings and transfers in urban areas. We make 
a distinction between the so-called average intention to treat, which 
measures the effect of the programme on the eligible population, and the 
average treatment on the treated, which measures the effect of the 
programme on recipients. The distinction between the two is very important 
in our context because of the low participation rates in the programme.  
The main programme effects are: (1) an increase in food consumption of 
roughly half or two-thirds the size of the transfer in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively; (2) a small increase in expenditure on durable items 
accompanied by a small increase in the ownership of certain electric goods; 
(3) a small drop in received transfers, especially in kind; and (4) a reduction 
in the stock of debt that is roughly equivalent to 8–10 per cent of the 
monthly transfer.  
Some aspects of the results are consistent with those obtained in the 
evaluation of the rural component of Oportunidades. For instance, both the 
large effect on food consumption and the crowding out of private transfers 
are consistent with the evidence from the rural component of the 
programme. Other aspects of the results, however, are different from those in 
rural areas. The most noticeable difference is the fact that while it seems that 
in rural areas beneficiary households are able to save a fraction of the grant 
or spend it on productive activities, the results we have reported for urban 
areas establish that savings are primarily used to pay off debts. How 
beneficial this is for the families depends on how costly this debt is. Taking 
into account the evidence of a reduction in transfers received by the 
beneficiary families, however, it seems unlikely that in the medium run the 
programme could generate the type of saving, and resulting acquisition of 
productive assets, observed in rural areas.  
A possible explanation for these differences could be related to the low 
participation in the programme in urban areas. The evidence we have seems 
to indicate that those who choose to enrol into the programme are the poorest 
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households among those eligible in urban areas. This might reflect that the 
size of the grant, kept at the same level as in rural areas, might be 
insufficient to induce participation by those households that would be most 
likely to save part of it. If the households that participate in urban areas are 
selected from the poorest among the eligible ones, as seems to be the case 
from the participation equation, it is possible that these households are less 
able to save even small fractions of the grant. Whether this is the case is an 
interesting area for further research. This intuition, if supported by additional 
investigations, would call for an increase, or at least a restructuring, of the 
grant in urban areas.  
Another result of interest is the fact that, proportionally, the increase in 
food consumption is a very large share of the increase in total consumption. 
This contradicts the prediction of a simple Engel curve for food. If food is a 
necessity, one would expect that, in the face of an exogenous shift in 
income, food consumption would increase less than proportionally relative 
to other components of consumption. Instead, we observe that the increase in 
food consumption is of the same order of magnitude as that of other 
components of consumption. There are two (not mutually exclusive) 
explanations for this phenomenon. The first points out that food, as an 
aggregate, is extremely heterogeneous, including basic staples, such as rice 
and tortilla, and more expensive items, such as meat. We know from the 
results in Attanasio and Shaw (2005) that most of the increase in food is 
observed in meat and other similar commodities. It is therefore plausible that 
behind the increase in the amount spent on food there is an upgrading of 
quality. The second explanation refers to the fact that the Oportunidades 
transfer is given to the mothers, who might have different preferences from 
the fathers. If that is the case, the fact that women have greater control of the 
family budget would modify the pattern of consumption for each level of 
income. This is the thesis suggested and tested by Attanasio and Lechene 
(2002) and Angelucci and Attanasio (2011), among others.  
The fact that the crowding out of private transfers is very limited is 
another interesting aspect of our findings. It means that the Oportunidades 
transfer reaches its intended beneficiaries. This is particularly important 
given the limited participation in the programme and evidence, documented 
in Angelucci and Attanasio (2011), that the participants are the poorest of the 
eligible households.  
Finally, a very interesting and positive aspect of the results is the 
considerable reduction in debt and the increased participation in the formal 
financial system that we seem to find. While we do not observe the increase 
in investment in productive activities documented in Gertler, Martinez and 
Rubio-Codina (2011), or at least not one of the same magnitude, the fact that 
beneficiary households use almost 10 per cent of the grant to reduce their 
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outstanding debt is suggestive that the impacts of the programme could be 
going in the same direction.  
What do these results imply for the success of the programme? 
Obviously, our findings do not provide all the elements that would be 
necessary for a full cost–benefit analysis of Oportunidades. For such an 
analysis, it would be necessary to take into account all of the programme’s 
impacts (including those on health and education) and all the consequences 
that these impacts have for the accumulation of human capital in the long 
run. This is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, in terms of the 
welfare of the current beneficiaries in the current period, what happens to 
consumption is probably most important. For one thing, consumption has a 
direct impact on welfare, nutritional status and satisfaction. And, more 
subtly, individual consumption decisions are informative of individual 
perceptions of available current and possibly future resources. Moreover, the 
analysis of the impacts of transfers, assets and access to the financial system 
that we have provided is informative of the mechanisms at play in generating 
the overall impacts of the programme. In this respect, although other papers 
have pointed out that the programme has had limited impacts on education 
and health outcomes in urban areas, the effects we have shown on 
consumption are important because they show that Oportunidades has been 
effective in reducing poverty, at least in the short run. This result is relevant 
in the current policy debate in which it has been pointed out that CCTs or, 
more generally, cash transfers might be relevant for developing countries 
mainly as effective redistributive tools.  
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